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"PROCEEDING" UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
DAVID G. EPSTEIN* 
The Uniform Commercial Code is the "most important piece of busi-
ness legislation ever prepared in the United States .... "1 "Article 9 is the 
most novel and probably the most important article in the Code."2 "The 
greatest change under the Code will probably come about in due time be-
cause of the so-called 'floating lien' "3 made possible in part by the Code's 
proceeds provision, section 9-306. The proceeds provision represents an 
innovation significant to both debtors and creditors. For example, in or-
der to carry on his business, the borrower who avails himself of inventory 
financing often desires some right to dispose of goods when they are 
ready for sale. In many states, however, prior to the Code, a chattel 
mortgage was fraudulent as a matter of law unless all proceeds resulting 
from the exercise of the power of sale were applied to reducing the mort-
gage debt.4 Similarly, in many states, prior to the Code, failure to "po-
lice" the borrower resulted in lender's loss of the lien. Section 9-306 
changes these pre-Code rules, and more.5 
Despite its importance, section 9-306 has received little attention from 
either the courts or legal commentators. 6 This article will explore three 
major problem areas under the Code proceeds provision. 
I. CREATION AND PERFECTION OF A SECURITY INTEREST 
IN PROCEEDS 
A. Creation 
In light of the desirability of obtaining a perfected security interest in 
proceeds it becomes important to determine how such an interest may be 
obtained. The initial inquiry is whether provision for proceeds must be 
made in the security agreement. 
This question merits consideration for two reasons. First, there pres-
• Member of the Arizona and Texas Bars, B.A., LLB. University of Texas, LL.M. Harvard. 
l Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951). 
2NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, WHY YOUR 
STATE SHOULD ENACT THE REv!SED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 67 (1958). 
3 Henson, The Prospective Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Commercial Financ-
ing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 349, 355. For a general discussion of the floating lien see KLAUS. 
Soh-m MODERN PROBLEMS IN INVENTORY AND ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE FINANCING, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FlRsT ANNuAL UNIFORM CODE INSTITUTE 149, 150 (1967). 
4 See generally Note, Mortgages on Fluctuating Stocks of Goods-Nature of Mortgagee's In-
terest, 28 ORE. L. REv. 376 (1949). 
fiJd. 
6 See 3 WILLmR AND HART, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTER DIGEST 2-1805 et 
seq. (1969). 
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ently exist a number of security agreements that inadvertently or mis-
takenly omitted any mention of proceeds. As Lord Devlin has observed, 
Businessmen have always given a lot of work to lawyers, for ... they 
do not bother much about the agreements they make until something goes 
wrong. This habit of mind distresses the lawyers; they look upon the bits 
of paper which the litigant produces with as much enthusiasm as a doctor 
surveys a row of patent medicine bottles out of which his patient has been 
dosing himself.7 
Second, it has been suggested by several legal writers that inclusion of 
specific language in the description of collateral pertaining to proceeds of 
the sale of the collateral may be construed as a grant of permission to sell, 
exchange or otherwise dispose of the original collateral.8 Where such 
permission is given to the debtor by the secured party, the sale, e."::change 
or other disposition of the original collateral terminates the security in-
terest therein leaving the secured party with only a security interest in 
the proceeds of the collateral.9 Comment 3 to § 9-306 provides that 
A claim to proceeds in a filed financing statement might be considered as 
impliedly authorizing sale or other disposition of the collateral, depend-
ing upon the circumstances of the parties, the nature of the collateral, the 
course of dealing of the parties and the usage of trade. . . [emphasis 
added]. 
While the comment is directed towards language in a financing state-
ment, it would seem that a proceeds provision in a security agreement 
would be similarly regarded. Perhaps such a provision in a security agree-
ment would be given even more weight as an indication of authorization 
of sale as the security agreement embodies the understandings of the 
debtor and secured parties as to their respective rights in the collateral. 
Thus, if a perfected security interest in proceeds can be obtained with-
out any language as to proceeds in the security agreement, it would seem 
advisable to omit any mention of proceeds. 
To be enforceable, a written security agreement must contain a de-
scription of the collateral. "Collateral" is defined in § 9-105 ( c) as "the 
property subject to a security interest ... " This definition seems all en-
compassing; if property is subject to a security interest, it must be "col-
lateral". If this is true, then proceeds subject to a security interest are 
"collateral" and must be described in a written security agreement for 
7 P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 4 ( 1962). But cf., In re Portland Newspaper Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (Ore. 1967), "Good business practice should be good 
business law." 
S E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.11 at 714 
( 1965)' (hereafter referred to as "GILMORE"); w. WILLIER AND F. HART, FORMS AND PRO-
CEDURES UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 9 926.14 (1969). But cf., Vermilion County 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 249 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. App. 1969); contra, Levie, Security 
Interest in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 962 (1969). 
9UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-306(2) (1962 version). 
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such agreement to be effective. There is language in § 9-203 ( 1) (b) that 
supports this position: 
In describing collateral, the word "proceeds" is sufficient without further 
description to cover proceeds of any character [emphasis added}. 
This provision raises a number of questions.10 What language other 
than the use of the word "proceeds" is sufficient to create a security in-
terest in proceeds? What is the significance of the concluding phrase, 
"of any character"? Does this mean that where the proceeds are of the 
same general description as the original collateral, they are covered by the 
security agreement irrespective of the agreement's provisions or lack of 
provisions as to proceeds? For example, the debtor owns and operates a 
used car lot and the collateral is described in terms of any and all cars 
held for sale on such lot. The debtor sells car X for cash and car Y. 
Debtor places car Y on his lot for sale. Does the security agreement 
cover car Y notwithstanding the absence of the word "proceeds" in the 
security agreement? Neither the Code, its comments, nor cases construing 
the Code have answered these questions. Rather, the question of whether 
any provision for proceeds need be made remains largely unresolved. 
Professor Gilmore11 is of the view that it is not necessary that the 
security agreement contain a proceeds clause. According to Professor 
Gilmore, "[t}he trouble with the§ 9-203 sentence quoted above is that, be-
ing embedded in a section dealing with formal requisites, it sounds like 
an additional formal requisite; that is, there would be no shift to pro-
ceeds, perfected or unperfected, unless the security agreement contained a 
proceeds clause. That was certainly not intended."12 Section 9-306(2) 
seems to support the Gilmore view; it provides in pertinent part: 
.A security interest continues in . . . any identifiable proceeds including 
collections received by the debtor. 
Again, the language of the Code is broad and all encompassing. The 
above excerpt from the Code seems to provide that when the debtor sells, 
e."changes or otherwise disposes of the collateral covered by the security 
agreement, the secured party obtains automatically a security interest in any 
proceeds of the sale or exchange regardless of whether the security agree-
ment contained any sort of proceeds provision. 
10 As Professor Mellinkoff irreverently, but accurately observed, "[Flor all its substantive 
contributions the UCC is a slipshod job of draftsmanship." Mellinkoff, The Language of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L. J. 185 (1967). But cf., Surrency, Research in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL L. F. 404, 406. 
11 "It is all but impossible to discuss ambiguous areas in the present Article 9 without find-
ing that .•• Professor Gilmore, like Kilroy ... [has] been there before." Kripke, Suggestions 
for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41 N. Y. U. L REV. 687, 692, 
( 1966). 
121 GILMORE,§ 11.4 at 351; accord, Lee, Perfection and Priorities under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 80 BANK. LJ. 473, 503 ( 1963); Note, Perfection of the Security Interest, 19 S.C. 
L. REV. 700, 721 ( 1966-67). 
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Professor Kripke finds further support for the position of an auto-
matic security interest in proceeds in the language of § 9-306(3) to the 
effect that a security interest in proceeds is perfected for ten days without 
any filing.13 He states: 
A provision for a period of grace within which to file would seem to have 
been unnecessary if the secured party were alerted to the need for filing 
by an express reference in his security agreement.14 
A final argument for "automatic perfection" can be based on the 
Code's definition of proceeds. Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as 
what is "received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, col-
lected or otherwise disposed of." This definition of "proceeds" in terms 
of both "collateral" and "proceeds" indicates that for some purposes the 
draftsmen of the Code considered proceeds separate and distinct from 
collateral. Thus, perhaps the requirement of a description of the "col-
lateral" in§ 9-203(1) (b) was not meant to apply to proceeds. 
In light of the ambiguity of the Code provisions and the absence of 
reported cases in the area, it would seem advisable to add to the descrip-
tion of collateral "all proceeds thereof" or other such similar language 
and to include some form of disclaimer of authorization of sale. For ex-
ample, the security agreement forms of a large southwestern national 
bank provide: "so long as any indebtedness remains unpaid, debtor . . . 
will not . . . sell, transfer, assign, deliver or otherwise dispose of any col-
lateral or any interest thereon without the prior written consent of se-
d ty "15 cure par .. 
B. Perfection 
Some confusion also exists as to whether the financing statements 
must mention proceeds in order for a security interest therein to be and 
remain perfected. Under § 9-306(3) a security interest in proceeds "be-
comes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor 
unless (a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral 
also covers proceeds; or (b) the security interest in the proceeds is per-
fected before the expiration of the ten day period." Again, the language 
of the Code raises a number of questions: When does a financing state-
ment "cover" proceeds? When does a financing statement "cover" 
original collateral but not proceeds? How is a security interest in pro-
ceeds perfected ? 
13Kripke, supra note 11, at 703. Other commentators are divided on automatic perfection 
of proceeds. Compare, e.g., 0. SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSAcnONS 101 (1963); with Duesen-
berg, Financing Inventory under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Resume for Missouri Law-
years, 29 Mo. L. R.Ev. 462, 481 (1964). 
14 Kripke, supra note 11, at 703. 
15 Security Agreement of First National Bank of Arizona. 
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Questions as to perfection by filing are by and large answered in Part 
Four of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.16 Section 9-402 
deals with the matter of contents of a financing statement. The follow-
ing parts of § 9-402 pertain to perfection of a security interest in proceeds: 
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it ... contains a statement 
indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral . . . 
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with subsec-
tion (1): 
4. (If proceeds or products of collateral are claimed) Proceeds-
Products of the collateral are also covered. . . . 
The same questions and arguments as were raised with regard to the 
language of § 9-203 apply to § 9-402. There have, however, been judicial 
decisions that have considered whether it is necessary to specifically pro-
vide for proceeds in a financing statement. In both The Clovis National. 
Bank v. Thomas,17 and In re Platt,18 courts denied claims of security in-
terest in proceeds where the filed financial statement did not expressly 
claim proceeds. In both decisions the courts relied solely upon the above 
language from § 9-306 ( 2). In neither case did the court consider the 
language from § 9-402-the section that is directed to the "formal req-
uisites of financing statement[ s }". 
While both the Clovis and Platt courts speak in absolute terms-no 
security interest in proceeds is perfected unless a financing statement 
mentions proceeds, neither decision is completely determinative of this 
question. In Clovis, the financing statement described the items of col-
lateral; under § 9-402 a financing statement may either describe the items 
of collateral or indicate the types thereof .19 Similarly, in Platt the pro-
ceeds were cash while the original collateral was accounts receivable. 
Thus, despite the broad language in both Clovis and Platt, neither case is 
controlling as to the situation where the financing statement indicates the 
type of collateral and the proceeds in question are items of the same type 
as the original collateral. For example, if Farmer Brown obtains a loan 
from the local bank, secured by the cows on his farm and the bank's 
financing statement merely indicates that it covers cows on Farmer Brown's 
16 Although Part 4 of Article 9 is entitled "Filing" not all of the Code's filing provisions are 
contained therein; e.g., UNIFORM COM~IBRCIAL CODE§ 9-302 (1962 version). 
17 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967). 
18 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
10 See generally, National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., Inc., 346 Mass. 255, 191 
N.E.2d 471 (1963). For other discussions of perfection of security interests in proceeds see 
Kripl:e, Braucher, Coogan, Gilmore and Haydock, Problems of Lenders, Borrowers and Sellers 
under the Uniform Commercial Code 67 ( 1968); Scull, Accounts Receivable Financing: Opera-
tional Problems under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 .Aruz. L. REV. 1, 13 (1969). 
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farm, it would seem that if Farmer Brown traded his cow X for Farmer 
Jones' cow Y, cow Y would be covered by the financing statement. 
II. SCOPE OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN PROCEEDS 
Assuming that the security agreement and the financial statement con-
tain proper provision for proceeds, it becomes necessary to ascertain the 
scope of protection a security interest in proceeds affords a lender. Sec-
tion 9-306(2) limits the interest to "identifiable" proceeds. While the 
phrase "identifiable proceeds" is nowhere defined in the Code or its com-
ments, a number of cases have now considered the phrase. All of these 
cases have simply applied common law tracing principles.2° For exam-
ple, in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc.,21 
the secured party had a perfected security interest in the new automobiles 
of debtor-dealer and in any and all proceeds thereof. The debtor sold 
the automobiles and deposited the proceeds in his bank accounts. Later, 
he used this money to purchase new automobiles. The court found that 
the subsequently acquired automobiles constituted identifiable proceeds 
and so were subject to the bank's security interest. In so holding, the 
court stated: 
We are of the opinion that the legislature intended to continue the earlier 
law which permitted a secured creditor to trace his collateral security into 
any identifiable proceeds, in the event of its disposition by the debtor and 
the only change that was made was as to cash which came into a receiver's 
possession.22 
As the last clause in the above excerpt indicates, the common law 
doctrine of tracing no longer applies to cash proceeds where there has 
been a receiver. Rather, § 9-306( 4) provides: 
( 4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a 
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has 
a perfected security interest 
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds; 
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is not 
commingled with other money or deposited in a bank account prior 
to the insolvency proceedings; 
( c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like 
which are not deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency 
proceedings; and 
( d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash pro-
ceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the 
perfected security interest under this paragraph ( d) is 
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and 
20 See generally, Skilton, Cars for Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of 
ANtomobiles, 1957 WISC. L. REV. 352, 407. 
2125 Pa. D. & C.2d 395, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 531 (1958). 
221 UCC REP. SERV. 531, 535 (1958). 
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(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any 
cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the 
institution of the insolvency proceedings and commingled or de-
posited in a bank account prior to the insolvency proceedings 
less the amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor and paid 
over to the secured party during the ten day period. 
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Apparently the above provision was drafted so as to avoid the prob-
lems that may arise in tracing after the cash proceeds of property subject 
to a security interest are deposited by the debtor in a bank account.23 
Cash not derived from the sale or exchange of collateral subject to the 
security agreement is already in this account or is subsequently added 
thereto. Afterwards, checks are drawn on the account, more funds are 
deposited. It becomes impossible to say whose cash remains in the ac-
count. Section 9-306(4), however, creates a number of new problems. 
The workings and misworkings of this subsection can most easily be 
understood by considering a number of hypothetical situations in which 
debtor X, has disposed of goods subject to a perfected security agreement 
that "covers" proceeds and has instituted "insolvency proceedings" as 
defined in § 1-201(22). If the proceeds are identifiable goods other 
than cash, the secured party, hereafter referred to as Y, has a security in-
terest therein.24 The same is true if the proceeds take the form of cash 
and the cash has been kept separate and apart from other money.25 There 
is some question as to whether Y's security interest will reach the cash 
if it has been deposited in a bank account, other than to the limited ex-
tent provided by § 9-306 ( 4)( d). It would seem that if the cash was not 
put in X's general account, but in a special separate account "with ap-
propriate restrictions on deposits and withdrawals" that Y's security in-
terest in the proceeds should continue. This is the position of Professor 
Gilmore.26 Yet, read literally, § 9-306(4)(b) seems to demand the con-
trary result: when money proceeds are deposited in a bank account prior 
to insolvency, the secured party's interest therein does not survive the in-
stitution of insolvency proceedings. 
Constructional arguments can be made to favor the former view. It 
can be urged that the word "not" in § 9-306(4)(b) refers only to "com-
mingled" so that the subsection describes two kinds of identifiable cash 
proceeds: (1) cash proceeds in the form of money which is not com-
mingled with other money and (2) cash proceeds deposited in a bank 
account. The obvious weakness with this constructional argument is that 
it results in cash deposited in X's general account as well as that seg-
regated in special accounts being regarded as "identifiable". Another 
23 See Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 52 (1951). 
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(4) (a) (1962 version). 
2uUNlFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9-306(4) (b) (1962 version). 
26 2 GILMORE, § 45.9 at 1338. 
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possible contention can be based on the phrase "cash" and bank accounts 
in §· 9-306(4)(d). From this it can be argued that bank accounts are 
not cash proceeds and so the question of whether Y's security interest 
reaches proceeds in the form of cash placed in a separate bank account is 
governed by § 9-306(4)(a)-not § 9-306(4)(b). Again there is a 
counter-argument. Section 9-306( 4) ( d) only indicates that the drafts-
men differentiated between cash and bank accounts-not that they e."{-
cluded bank accounts from the general term "cash proceeds". 
The UCC as adopted in California expressly provides for deposits 
in separate bank accounts; the California version of§ 9-306(4)(a) reads: 
". . . identifiable noncash proceeds and in a separate bank account con-
taining only proceeds ... " .27 The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,28 in rejecting the uniform adoption of this addi-
tion said: 
In this variation California has sought to make clear that if commingling 
of cash proceeds has been avoided by depositing them in a separate bank 
account containing only proceeds, the cash involved is subject to the same 
rule as that applicable to identifiable non-cash proceeds and undeposited 
cash proceeds, rather than the rule applicable to commingled cash. Cali-
fornia's problem is no doubt suggested by the e."Xdusion under Section 
9-104(k) of 'transfers ... of any deposit ... or like account maintained 
with the bank .. .' But this exclusion in 9-104 must be read with 9-306, 
which clearly covers bank accounts containing non-proceeds and, by im-
plication, aided by the general definition of 'proceeds,' it must be read as 
California has more clearly stated it. In short, California has only made 
explicit what is otherwise the necessary construction of the statute.29 
Unfortunately, the Permanent Editorial Board is as ambiguous in reject-
ing additions to the Code as it was in drafting the Code. The first 
two sentences, along with the last one, indicate an appreciation for the 
problem and an implicit adoption of the California result. The middle 
sentences, however, with their references to § 9-104(k) only confuse the 
matter. "California's problem" is suggested by § 9-306(4) (b), not § 
9-104(k).30 
The same questions and arguments arise where the proceeds take the 
form of checks and are deposited in a separate bank account.31 
Where the cash proceeds have been commingled with other cash of 
27CAL. CODE ANN.§ 9306(4) (a) (1964). 
28 Professor Mellinkoff describes the Permanent Editorial Board as a "sort of French Acad-
emy of the UCC charged with guarding the purity of UCC talk." Mellinkoff, The Language of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L J. 185, 224 (1967). 
29 REPORT NO. 2 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMllR.-
CIAL CODE 211-12 ( 1964). 
30 If the Permanent Editorial Board did misunderstand the import of the California modi-
fication, they do not lack for company. See, C. SMITH & C. BROWN, AruzoNA U.C.C. STIJDY 
COMMENTS 195 ( 1967) . 
31 UNIFORM COMMBRCIAL CODE § 9-306(4) (c) (1962 version). 
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X or deposited in his general bank account, then Y has a security in-
terest in all of X's cash and all his bank accounts, subject to an amount 
limitation described in comment 2 (a) to § 9-306 as: 
the amount of cash proceeds received and commingled or deposited with-
in the 10 days before insolvency proceedings were instituted less the 
amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor and paid over to the se-
cured party during that period ... 32 
Again, illustration by examples is the best means of explanation. X 
deposits the cash proceeds in the sum of $10,000 in his general bank ac-
count in Bank A nine days before insolvency proceedings are instituted. 
Y's perfected security interest would extend to this account subject to the 
ten thousand dollar limitation. Likewise, if X also had bank accounts in 
Banks B and C, Y's security interest would extend thereto, notwithstand-
ing the fact that no proceeds had ever been deposited in said accounts. 
In the opinion of the California draftsmen this was too favorable to 
the secured party.33 Therefore, as enacted in California, § 9-306( 4) ( d) 
limits the secured party to a lien on those bank accounts in which pro-
ceeds of his collateral have actually been commingled with other funds. 
In this instance, the California variation is an improper one. Where 
the debtor has commingled cash proceeds in checking account A within 
ten days of the institution of insolvency proceedings, and at the time of 
such proceedings, checking account A has no funds, but checking account 
B does, the secured party should be able to look to checking account B. 
A secured party's rights should not be diminished because the debtor hap-
pened to pick up the check book for account A to pay a bill rather than 
that for account B. 
If X commingles $10,000 of proceeds in a bank account on Janu-
ary 1st and on January 2nd he receives and pays over to Y an additional 
$5,000 in cash proceeds, and insolvency proceedings be instituted by or 
against X on January 3rd, Y's claim to the bank account is secured only 
up to $5,000. Read literally, § 9-306( 4) ( d) requires that money repre-
senting proceeds of collateral paid over to the secured party must be sub-
tracted from cash proceeds deposited by the debtor in commingled bank 
accounts in order to determine the secured party's right in such account. 
But if on January 2, X had placed the additional $5,000 in the com-
mingled account, Y's claim would have been secured in the amount of 
$15,000. In the first situation, Y in effect receives $10,000; in the sec-
32 For a more detailed explanation of calculations under § 9-306 ( 4) ( d) see 2 GILMORE 
§ 45.9 at 1338-9. 
33 See SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY SENATE FACT FINDING CoM-
MilTEE ON JUDICIARY (1959-61), PART 1, THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 571-572. For 
a contra!}' view see the statement by Louis Russo, Vice President and Resident Counsel, Chase 
National Bank, 32 NEW Yoruc LAW REvISION Co:i.n.nssION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoM-
1.-ffiRCIAL CODE 66 (1954). 
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ond instance, $15,000. There is no valid policy reason for this differ-
ence. To avoid it the word "such" should be added to or read into § 
9-306( 4) ( d) just before the last "cash proceeds." In this way, only 
proceeds that were first commingled and then paid over will be deducted. 
III. THE PROCEEDS PROVISION IN BANKRUPTCY34 
One of the principal reasons a creditor insists upon collateral as se-
curity is to protect himself against the default and bankruptcy of the 
debtor by providing a source for payment of the debt that cannot be 
utilized by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy to pay other creditors.31; 
Thus, in determining the value of a particular security interest, it is nec-
essary to consider its validity not only as against the debtor and his other 
creditors but also as against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. 
For well over a decade, legal writers have questioned the enforcibil-
ity of the right created by § 9-306( 4)( d) in debtor's bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.36 To date, no reported cases have considered this point. There 
are, however, cases considering the enforcibility of liens arising under 
statutes sufficiently similar to § 9-306 ( 4) ( d) to merit extended consid-
eration. 
A. Lien or Priority 
Section 9-306( 4)( d) of the Uniform Commercial Code is the "lineal 
descendant"37 of Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act which pro-
vided as follows: 
Where, under the terms of the trust receipt transaction, the trustee . • . 
having liberty of sale . . . is to account to the entruster for the proceeds 
of any disposition of the goods . . . the entruster shall be entitled, to the 
extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom his se-
curity interest was valid at the time of disposition by the trustee, as fol-
lows ... (b) to any proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether such 
proceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods . . . if said proceeds were 
received by the trustee within ten days prior to either application for ap-
pointment of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bank-
34 "There is a story that Karl Llewelyn had a five-foot shelf of commercial law books. My 
impression is that he did not have the Bankruptcy Act in that five-foot shelf." KENNEDY, 
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO THE CODE, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE FIRST ANNuAL UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE INSTITUTE 177 ( 1967). See generally, 
Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy; A Pro-
posed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1969). 
35 The "acid test" of a security interest is whether it stands in bankruptcy. Newman, The 
Uniform Commercial Code in the Bankruptcy Environment, 15 PRAC. LAW. 67, 68 (1969). 
36 E.g., Comment, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Conflicts, 53 
Nw. U.L. REV. 411 (1958-59). Mr. Henson finds even earlier "traces" of the problem. "The 
conceptual problem involved here is at least 2,500 years old." Henson, "Proceeds" Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232, 233 ( 1965). 
37 2 GILMORE, § 45.9 at 1340. 
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ruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or de-
mand made by the entruster for prompt accounting, and to a priority to 
the amount of such proceeds or value ... as 
797 
Note the use of the word "priority". The Bankruptcy Act invalidates all 
state created priorities except those in favor of landlords' rent claims, 
which are postponed.39 On the other hand, state-created statutory liens 
are valid in bankruptcy and are satisfied after administration expenses 
and wage priorities have been paid.40 Thus, the validity of Section 10 of 
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in bankruptcy depends upon whether it 
creates a priority, as its language seems to indicate, or a lien. Two re-
ported cases considered this matter and reached two very different results. 
In In re Harpeth Motors,41 the creditor held a series of trust receipts, 
each covering a separate automobile.42 Prior to instituting bankruptcy 
proceedings, the trustee dealer mingled the proceeds from the sale of the 
cars with his other assets. The creditor filed a petition asserting a lien 
upon the amount of the proceeds of the sale. The court focused upon 
the wording of the introductory provisions of Section 10 to the effect 
that the entruster has a right to proceeds ". . . to the e..xtent to which and 
as against all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid 
at the time of disposition by the trustee ... "43 Since such "classes of 
persons" includes subsequent lien creditors of the trustee-debtor, the se-
curity interest of the entruster was held enforceable against the trustee as 
the representative of such lien creditors. 
Subsequently, the same issue arose in Crosstown Motors, Inc. v. Al-
len.H There the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite result relying pri-
marily on legislative history and use of the word "priority": 
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act was drafted long prior to 1938. It was 
adopted by the Illinois legislature in 1935. At that time § 64 of the 
Bankruptcy Act specifically recognized state-created priorities. Thus the 
object to be obtained by § 10 of the Illinois Trust Receipts Act was to 
give to the entruster a priority ahead of general creditors upon insolvency 
of the trustee. Nothing more was necessary. Nothing more was contem-
plated. The legislative intent is crystal dear. 
When the legislature provided in § 10 that the entruster was entitled, 
38 The UTRA has been supplanted by the Uniform Commercial Code. UNIFORM COM· 
?.IBRCIAL CoDE § 10-102 (1962 version). 
39Bankruptcy Act§ 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958), amending 52 Stat. 874 (1938). The 
Bankruptcy Act does not expressly invalidate state priorities, but this is the necessary result since 
the Act's scheme of distribution is e.."'clusive. See, e.g., Halpert v. Industrial Commission of State 
of New York, 147 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1945); Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941). 
40 J. MAc!.ACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY,§ 212 at 234 (1956). 
41135 F. Supp. 863 (l\f.D. Tenn., 1955). 
42 For an explanation of trust receipt financing, see generally, Bacon, A Trust Receipt Trans-
action: II, 5 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 240 (1936). 
43 In re Harpeth Motors, 135 F. Supp. 863, 865 (M.D. Tenn. 1955). 
44 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959). Commercial Credit Corp. v. Allen, 363 U.S. 811 (1960). 
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on the insolvency of the trustee, "to a priority to the amount of" the pro-
ceeds from the goods or the value thereof it meant exactly what it said, 
i.e., priority. A cursory examination of the entire Act clearly illustrates 
that when the legislature intended to mean lien the word "lien" was 
used.45 
Recognizing that a lien is quite different from a priority, and then 
considering an interest clearly labeled as a "priority" to be a lien has an 
"Alice in Wonderland" type air to it.46 Nevertheless, the reasoning of 
the Harpeth court has been favored by a consensus of the commentators.41 
Essentially, the question seems to be one of which should control, sub-
stance or form.48 The most recent and best reasoned decisions favor the 
former. For example, In re Trahan,49 found an interest designated 
"vendor's privilege" to be a lien. 
This substance-form dichotomy assumes even greater significance with 
regard to § 9-306( 4)( d) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
Uniform Commercial Code was revised after the Harpeth and Crosstown 
decisions and presumably in any light of their implications. Apparently 
§ 9-306( 4) ( d) was drafted to meet as well as possible the arguments that 
had been advanced against the invalidity in bankruptcy of Section 10 
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act as it applied to the unidentified pro-
ceeds.50 The problem of semantics has been avoided by the use of the 
phrase "security interest" instead of "priority". Despite this change and 
the consideration that obviously must have been given this matter, § 
9-306 ( 4)( d) on its face seems much more like a priority provision than 
Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The Code provision ap-
plies only "in the event of insolvency proceedings". Thus, the problem 
presented by § 9-306( 4)( d) is the mirror image of that presented in 
45 272 F.2d at 226-27. 
46 In Alice in Wonderland, the White Knight tells Alice that he will sing a song and "the 
name of the song is called Haddocks' Eyes." 
"Oh, that's the name of the song, it is?" Alice said, trying to feel interest. 
"No, you don't understand," the Knight said, looking a little vexed. "That's what the name 
is called. The name really is 'The Aged, Aged Man.' " 
"Then I ought to have said, 'That's what the song is called'?" Alice corrected herself. 
"No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song is called 'Ways and Means': but 
that's only what it's called, you know.'' 
"Well, what is the song, then?" said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered. 
"I was coming to that," the Knight said. "The song really is 'A-sitting on a Gate': and the 
tune's my own invention.'' 
41 E.g., Duesenberg, Lien or Priority under Section 10, Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 1 B.C. 
IND. & COM. L. REV. 73 (1959-61). Hanna, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS 
L. R.Ev. 471, 478 (1959-60); contra, Comment, Bankruptcy-Uniform Trust Receipts Act Sec-
tion lO(b)-Security Interest in the General Assets of the Trustee not Created, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
948 (1960). 
48 For a discussion of the "substance of a lien" see generally, MacLachlan, Improving the 
Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 2 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 73 (1959-61). 
49 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968). 
50 See Rudolph, Judicial Construction of the Trust Receipts Act and Its Reflection in the 
Commercial Code, 19 U. PITI". L. REV. 1, 17 (1957-58). 
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Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Acts: form indicates a lien 
while substance seems to indicate priority. No cases have considered this 
point and the secondary authority is divided. 51 
It is suggested that this problem can be solved, or at least avoided, 
by looking to other sections of the Bankruptcy Act.ll2 Section 67c(l) (A) 
invalidates: 
every stat11tory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of 
the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon 
execution against his property levied at the instance of one other than the 
lienor [emphasis added]. 
This provision was added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1966;53 the legislative 
history of the provision indicates that its invalidation standards were 
adopted in order to separate the true lien from those spurious devices 
which are priorities disguised as liens.54 Its standards, however, operate 
only upon devices that are for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act statu-
tory liens. This indicates a legislative intent that "lien" as used in the 
Bankruptcy Act include interests which first become effective on insol-
vency. Further, a narrow construction of the term "lien" based upon the 
substantive tests of the Harpeth case frustrates this congressional policy 
by making the invalidation standard inapplicable to the very devices 
which the standards were intended to invalidate. Thus, it is suggested 
that the term "lien" should encompass every device which has been de-
nominated lien as well as all those devices which have the substantive char-
acteristic of liens. So, assuming that the interest created by § 9-306 ( 4) ( d)' 
is for Bankruptcy Act purposes a lien, it becomes necessary to determine 
whether this lien is a "statutory lien." It it is, it seems dear that it will be 
invalidated by § 67c(l)(A), set out above, as it becomes effective upon 
the insolvency of the debtor. 55 
B. Statutory Lien 
Section 9-102(2) provides in part: "This article does not apply to 
statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310."56 From this it would 
Ill Compare 2 GILMORE, § 45.9 at 1336, with Comment, Bankruptcy-Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act Section JO(b)-Security Interest in the General Assets of the Trustee not Created, 55 
N.Y.L.U. Rllv. 948, 953 n. 40 (1960). 
52 Bear in mind the recent concession by Senator Ervin: "I will admit if you start reading 
all of the sections of the bankruptcy law you reach a state of great intellectual confusion." Hear-
ings on S. 976 (H.R. 3438) and S. 1912 (H.R. 136) Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 ( 1965). 
53 See generally, Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REV. 149 
(1966·67). 
54 S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 ( 1966). 
Ii~ Cf. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966). 
liGSce generally, Comment, NonconsenSflal Liens Under Article 9, 76 YALE L.J. 1649 (1966-
67). 
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seem that the lien created by § 9-306 ( 4) ( d) is not a statutory lien. 
The Bankruptcy Act, however, contains a definition of statutory lien and 
under the Supremacy Clause if the interest created by § 9-306( 4) ( d) 
comes within the Bankruptcy Act's definition of statutory lien, it is a 
statutory lien regardless of what the Code itself provides.57 
Section 1 (29a) defines statutory lien as: 
[A J lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances 
or conditions, but shall not include any lien provided by or dependent 
upon an agreement to give security, whether or not such lien is also pro-
vided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether or not the agree-
ment or lien is made fully effective by statute. 
The controlling phrases in this definition seem to be "solely by force of 
statute" and "provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give se-
curity." 
There must be a security agreement before § 9-306( 4) ( d) comes into 
existence. Thus, it can be said that this section is "dependent upon an 
agreement to give security." On the other hand, as previously discussed, 
it is unsettled whether a proceeds provision in the security agreement 
is a prerequisite to rights under § 9-306 ( 4)( d); if not, and if there is no 
proceeds provision, then it is at least arguable that the lien created is a 
statutory lien-that it is not dependent upon an agreement to give se-
curity. The argument becomes more difficult, however, when the se-
curity agreement contains a proceeds provision even though none is re-
quired. Reading "provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give 
security" literally, a statutory lien such as an artisan's lien could be con-
verted into a non-statutory, consensual claim for Bankruptcy Act pur-
poses by mere incorporation of the relevant statutory lien language into 
the contract signed by the party. 
The necessity for and presence of a mention of proceeds in the fi-
nancing statement is no evidence of a statutory nature of § 9-306 ( 4) ( d). 
The legislative history of § 1 ( 29a) indicates that: 
The definition is directed at preventing a reoccurrence of the misapplica-
tion which appeared in the first decision in the Quaker City case. There 
the court held that since the chattel mortgage depended upon the Pennsyl-
vania recording statute for its effectiveness against subsequent transferees, 
the chattel mortgage was a statutory lien.us 
On balance, § 9-306 ( 4) ( d) should not be regarded as a statutory 
lien.59 Although it may not always be "provided by" the agreement be-
57 See, e.g., Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931); Comment, The Commercial Code and the 
Bankmptcy Act: Potential Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 411, 412 (1958-59); but cf. Viles, The 
Uniform Commercial Code v. the Bankruptcy Act, 15 KY. LJ. 636, 661 (1966-67). 
58 S. Rep. No. 1159, supra note 54, at 5. 
59 Contra, e.g., Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency: Ar-
ticle 9, 67 COM. L. J. 113, 117 ( 1962); Note, Creditors Rights-Amendment to Bankruptcy 
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tween the parties, it is always "dependent upon" the existence of a basic 
security agreement between the parties. Additionally, the term "statu-
tory" contemplates and implies devices which arise primarily from a legis-
latively defined economic relationship. 60 The interest created by § 9-306 
( 4) ( d) will always, of course, arise from a consensual relationship. 
C. Section 70c 
The lien of § 9-306( 4)( d) is vulnerable, in some instances under § 
70c of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 70c endows the bankruptcy trustee 
with four separate powers with which to challenge the interests of other 
persons in the property of the bankrupt: the trustee may assert the rights 
of the bankrupt himself or, regardless of whether such a creditor actu-
ally exists, the rights of a hypothetical judgment creditor, a hypothetical 
creditor with an unsatisfied execution, or a hypothetical lien creditor with 
a lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings on all the bankrupt's 
property.61 The choice of which of these powers the trustee will use in a 
given case is left up to him. Consideration of only the last alternative--
hypothetical lien creditor-points up the § 70c problem. 
While it was once asserted that § 70c gave the trustee rights of a 
hypothetical lien creditor who had obtained his lien any time before 
bankruptcy, 62 it is now settled that the lien is one which occurs at the 
time of bankruptcy.63 Where the initial insolvency proceeding is the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy petition, the lien of § 9-306( 4)( d) would not 
come into existence until this time, thus the secured party's lien would 
attach simultaneously with the trustee's lien right. Again, there has been 
no case law to settle the question of which lien or claim should prevail in 
such an instance. Mr. Henson opts for the secured creditor because the 
trustee's lien cannot be superior.64 This seems to beg the question. Two 
Act, Invalidates and Postpones .Many Statutory Liens and Clarifies Priority among Liens in Bank-
ruptcy, 45 TJlXAs L R.BV. 374, 377 (1966-67). 
60 See, e.g., Lawrence v. United States, 378 F.2d 452, 467, (5th Cir. 1962); 4 J. MOORE 
AND R. OGLEBAY, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 5 67.20[2] at 217 (14th ed. 1968) [cited here-
after as COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. 
61 See generally, v. CoUNTRYMAN, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 481-504 ( 1964). 
62 See Constance v. Harry, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955); 
V. COUNTRYMAN, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 494 (1964). 
63 See Treister, The Rise and Fall of Constance 11. Harvey, 36 CALIF. S.B.J. 194, 202 (1961). 
But cf. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962). The statute there in-
volved made delayed recordings invalid as to all subsequent creditors. There was a real sub-
sequent creditor but he had been paid off by the secured creditor. The court was thus faced with 
construction of "whether or not such a creditor acrually e.~sts" in § 70c. The court read this 
as requiring an acrual creditor even though it was not necessary for the actual creditor to have 
a lien. No other circuit has taken this position and the decision has been severely criticized. See 
King, Pacific Finance Corporation 11. Edwards: Another llfisreading of Section 70c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 63 COLUM. L REV. 232 ( 1963). 
64 Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLUM. L. R.BV. 232 
(1965). 
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other law review writers have stated that the trustee's interest is superior.66 
While general notions of Federalism and the Supremacy Clause would 
indicate that this result is a proper one, the authority relied upon in the 
two law review writings is questionable. 
Professor Marsh, a leading bankruptcy authority, relies directly on 
N. W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 66 which is at best indirectly relevant to 
the matter at hand. The case involved a Massachusetts statute that gave 
a lien to materialmen on sums due to a contractor out of the particular 
contract for which they supplied work or materials in the event of ap-
pointment of a receiver, and assignment to the benefit of creditors, or an 
adjudication bankruptcy of the contractor. The attempt of the statutory 
lienors to assert their lien in a bankruptcy proceeding was rejected in a 
brief opinion by the Court of Appeals, which characterized the statute as 
an attempt to impose a different order of distribution after the rights of 
the parties had been fixed by the filing of the petition. 
A student writer tried to use a series of hypotheticals to support the 
trustee's superiority. He reasoned that (1) if on the day bankruptcy 
proceedings were instituted, a creditor obtained a lien on the proceeds 
and bankruptcy proceedings were not instituted, this creditor would have 
priority over the secured creditor, as the secured creditor's § 9-306( 4) ( d) 
lien does not arise until the institution of the insolvency proceedings.67 
Second, "a trustee in bankruptcy shall have the rights of a hypothetical 
lien creditor at the date of bankruptcy."68 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
bankruptcy trustee's § 70 claim prevails over § 9-306( 4) ( d) lien. This 
reasoning breaks down in the second premise. While a number of cases 
and secondary authorities use the phrase "date of bankruptcy" as the time 
from which the trustee's § 70c rights are to be measured,69 the Supreme 
Court in Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit,10 refined the 
concept of "date of bankruptcy" to "the time when the petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed."71 
Even assuming that the "tie goes to the trustee" § 70c will not always 
invalidate a § 9-306 ( 4)( d) lien. Where bankruptcy is preceded by an 
65Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L 
REV. 681, 715 (1966-67); Comment, Toward Commercial Reasonableness: An Examination of 
Some of the Conflicts Between Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy 
Act, 19 SYR. L. REV. 939, 953 (1967-68); cf. KENNEDY, BANKRUPTCY, AND INSOLVENCY 
PROBLEMS, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRS'l' ANNUAL UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE INsn-
TUTE, 177, 185 (1967). 
66 343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965). 
67 Comment, supra note 65, at 954. 
68Jd. 
69 E.g., Pacific Finance Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962); 76 HARV. L. REV. 
1296, 1298 ( 1962-63). 
70 364 u. s. 603 (1961). 
71 Jd. at 606. See also In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80, 82 (Mass. 1961); Marsh, 
Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A. L REV. 898, 908 (1965-66). 
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assignment for the benefit of creditors or other state insolvency proceed-
ings, the § 9-306 ( 4)( d) lien will arise at the time of the state insol-
vency proceeding and therefore not be vulnerable to a lien creditor whose 
lien arises at the time of bankruptcy. The same is the case where the 
cash in bank accounts are identifiable up until the time of bankruptcy.72 
Thus it becomes necessary to consider still another bankruptcy provision. 
D. Section 60 
The notion underlying § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act is that "an insol-
vent debtor contemplating bankruptcy should not be able to defeat the 
bankruptcy policy of equality in distribution by transferring his property 
to favored creditors shortly before the bankruptcy petition is filed."73 
The Bankruptcy Act details an order of distribution of the debtor's assets 
in the event of his bankruptcy. This order, and the Bankruptcy Act itself 
would be of little importance if immediately before instituting bank-
ruptcy proceedings the debtor could simply decide which of his creditors 
he should favor and pay them the assets that he then has. To prevent 
such conduct on the part of the debtor, § 60 invalidates certain prefer-
ential transfers made by the debtor immediately prior to bankruptcy. 






Transfer of non-exempt property of the debtor; 
To a creditor; 
For or on account of antecedent debt; 
Within four months of the filing of bankruptcy petition; 
(5) Enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt 
than some other creditor of the same class;74 
72 See infra note 73. 
73 Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 76, 77 (1951). 
7i While it is true that the bankrupt act does not define the word "class," nor in 
terms state what creditors are of the same class, it creates some classes, and specifies 
others, and it seems to us that the meaning of the word "class" in the act should, if 
possible, be derived from the statute itself. Section 64, after directing the payment of 
certain expenses of administration, creates three classes of creditors,-parties to whom 
taxes are owing, employes holding claims for certain wages, and those who, by the 
laws of the state or of the United States, are entitled to priority. Sections 56b, 57e, 
and 57h provide for the treatment and disposition of claims secured by property, and 
of claims which have priority. The creditors who hold these various claims; and the 
general creditors of the estate, constitute the classes of creditors of which the bankrupt 
act treats. Now, if any one of these various classes is taken by itself and examined, it 
will be seen that each one of the creditors in the same class always receives the same 
percentage upon his claim, out of the estate of the bankrupt, that every other creditor 
of his class receives. Where the estate is insufficient to pay the claims of different 
classes in full, the classes receive, out of the bankrupt estate, different percentages of 
their claims, but creditors of the same class receive the same percentage. The test of 
classification is the percentage paid upon the claims out of the estate of the bankrupt. 
Swarts v. Fourth National Bank of St. Louis, 117 F. 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1902). See also, Comment, 
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( 6) Insolvency75 on the part of the debtor at the time of the trans-
fer and knowledge of the same on the part of the creditor. 
The initial element is here controlling; if for purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Act, § 9-306( 4) ( d) constitutes a transfer of property of the debtor, it is 
a preferential transfer.76 
The term "transfer" is defined in most comprehensive terms by sec-
tion 1, clause 30 of the Bankruptcy Act. It includes every manner direct or 
indirect, of parting with property. It also covers the affi.Wig of a lien 
upon property. A transfer may be effected irrespective of any voluntary 
action of the debtor with reference to the disposition of his property, 
since the transfer may be voluntary or involuntary, with or without judi-
cial proceedings. Thus, it would seem that a transfer for purposes of § 
60 of the Bankruptcy !A.ct generally would occur at the time of institution 
of insolvency proceedings even though involuntarily by force of statute. 
This transfer would be to a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent 
debt within four months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition while 
the debtor was insolvent.77 Generally, at the time insolvency proceedings 
are instituted a creditor will have reasonable cause to believe that the 
debtor is insolvent. Finally, unless the creditor was fully secured, this 
transfer will have a preferential effect. 
Mr. Henson, a member of the Review Committee for Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, contends that no transfer for purposes of § 
60 occurs at the time of insolvency proceedings; rather, there is no trans-
fer after the date the original secured transaction has been perfected.78 
In essence, he views the original collateral, identifiable proceeds and § 
9-306( 4)( d) proceeds as a mass or an entity the transfer of which takes 
place at the time the perfected security interest attaches to the initial com-
ponents of the mass.79 This "entity" theory has been most commonly 
raised in a related context-the conflict between the after acquired prop-
erty provision of the Code and § 60. 
Section 9-204(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code permits a credi-
tor to obtain a security interest in collateral which the debtor may acquire 
in the future. This "floating lien" is of particular importance where the 
collateral is in a shifting form such as accounts receivable or inventory of 
"Class"-The Forgotten Element of Section 60(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 .Aruz L REv. 
360 (1969). 
75 The question of insolvency is dealt with by § 1 ( 19) of the Bankruptcy Act; it is "balance 
sheet" insolvency as opposed to insolvency in the "equity sense." See generally Burchfield, The 
Balance Sheet Test of Insolvency, 23 U. PITI. L REV. 5 ( 1961-62). 
76 See generally 3 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 60.34 at 902. 
77 All elements are tested as of the time of transfer. See Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 
297 U.S. 227 ( 1936). 
78 Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 232, 248-
52 (1965). 
79 This theory apparently finds its origin in dictum in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 
F.2d 827, 831 (1st. Cir. 1951), a decision involving the New Hampshire Factor's Lien Act. 
1969] SECTION 9-306 805 
a retail business. The security interest in the after acquired property 
has equal status with an interest in existing property except that the Code 
permits subsequent purchase money security interest to take priority if 
certain notice requirements are met.80 
The time the trans£ er of after acquired property occurs is of crucial 
importance in the event of the bankruptcy of the debtor. If such transfer 
occurred within si.x months of insolvency, there is a strong likelihood that 
it constitutes a § 60 preferential transfer. Section 60 (a) ( 2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act fi.xed the date on which the transfer of the debtor's property is 
deemed to occur: 
A transfer of real property other than real property shall be deemed to 
have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected 
that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equit-
able proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights 
of the transferee. 
Perfection under the Code requires that the security interest attach to 
the collateral. Under § 9-204(1) a security interest does not attach un-
til (1) there is a written agreement that it attach, (2) an advance or 
payment is made pursuant to the agreement, and (3) the debtor obtains 
rights in the collateral described in the agreement. Section 9-402(2) pro-
vides that a debtor can have no rights in accounts until they come into ex-
istence. 
From the above Code provisions, it would seem that the transfer of 
after acquired property does not occur for purposes of § 60 until the 
debtor receives this property. To date, however, every court that has 
considered this question has adopted Henson's "entity theory" and found 
the date of transfer to be the date of perfection of the security agree-
ment. 81 While this is perhaps sound policy, it is questionable statutory 
construction. 82 
The policy relied on in these cases-"[t]he business community has 
BO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9-312(3),(4) (1962 version). 
81 See, Du Bay v. Williams, CCH SECURED TRANS. REP.~ 51, at 148 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain 
Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1 (7th Cir. 1969); 
Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967). See generally Healy, The Floating 
Lien Controversy in the Courts: Judicial Response to the Preference Problem, 10 B.C. IND. & 
COM. L. REv. 265 (1969). 
82 In addition to the problems raised by the code sections mentioned in the text above, there 
is a problem as to whether the entity theory was adopted by the Code. There is no mention of 
it therein. Rather, in § 9-108 the Code seeks to avoid the preference problem by stating that 
the transfer of an interest in these after-acquired items shall not be deemed to be for an "ante-
cedent debt." It has been argued from this that the draftsman believed that the security interest 
in the after-acquired property did not become fully perfected until the debtor obtained rights in 
the individual items of such property. See Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L REV. 
49, 54-55 (1962); Contra 2 GILMORE§ 45.5at1305; but cf. Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with 
Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 553, 
560 (1967-68). 
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depended upon a revolving or flow type of accounts receivable financing 
for many years."83-is not applicable. There has been no long standing 
dependency upon liens on unidentifiable proceeds; such a lien was largely 
unavailable until the adoption of the Code.84 Further, application of the 
"entity theory" to a§ 9-306(4)(d) lien on proceeds subverts not only§ 
60 of the Bankruptcy Act and the relevant Code provisions but the "en-
tity theory" itself. Regarding identifiable proceeds as a part of the orig-
inal mass is one matter; treating unidentifiable proceeds requires an even 
greater "imagination". 
There is another "floating lien argument" that can be raised here, 
substitution of collateral. Mere substitution or exchange of property is 
preferential only to the extent that the value of the creditor's interest in 
the substituted property exceeds the value of the creditor's interest in the 
original property.85 Thus, where the value of the identifiable proceeds 
in the form of cash and bank accounts immediately before bankruptcy 
equals or exceeds the value of the lien on unidentifiable proceeds created 
by § 9-306 ( 4)( d) there has been no preferential transfer. Often, how-
ever, the value of the identifiable proceeds immediately prior to insol-
vency will be less than § 9-306(4)(6)'s measure of unidentifiable pro-
ceeds. In such instances, the substitution theory should not bar the oper-
ation of§ 60. 
Note, however, the time the value of the identifiable proceeds should 
be measured-immediately prior to bankruptcy. Pre-Code case law re-
quires that the substitution be simultaneous and for equal value.86 Re-
cently, however, the Seventh Circuit in Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. 
v. Union Bank and Savings Company81 indicated that: 
As previously observed under Section 9-205 of the Commercial Code, it 
was unnecessary for the Bank to assume dominion over individual accounts 
83 Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 6 UCC REP. SBRV. 1, 10 
(7th Cir. 1969). 
84. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306, Comment 2, (1962 version). 
B5See, e.g., Walker v. Commercial Nat'! Bank of Little Rock, 217 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 
1954); Hogan, supra note 81, at 562. 
86 See In re Pusey-Maynes-Breish Co., 38 F. Supp. 316, 321 (E. D. Pa.), affd 122 F.2d 606 
(3d Cir. 1941). Section 60 (a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Act seems to codify this result by pro-
viding: 
If no such requirement of applicable law specified in paragraph (7) of this subdi-
vision exists, a transfer wholly or in part, for or on account of a new and contempo-
raneous consideration shall, to the extent of such consideration and interest thereon and 
the other obligations of the transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or 
suffered at the time of the transfer. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such a loan 
is actually made, or a transfer which becomes security for a future loan, shall have the 
same effect as a transfer for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration. 
The quoted section reflects both requirements; the collateral must be given for a present or fu-
ture loan, and the transfer is valid only to the e.'ttent of the new consideration. 
87 Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 6 UCC REP. SBR\•. 1 
(7th Cir. 1969). 
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receivable. Therefore, it is no longer appropriate to apply strict timing or 
value rules ... ss 
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This is a non-sequitur. Section 9-205 only abolishes the rule of Benedict 
v. Ratner.89 There the Court held that a financing arrangement which 
gave the debtor unfettered dominion over the collateral was fraudulent 
as to the third parties and hence void. Benedict v. Ratner had no con-
nection with the timing and value limitations under § 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Transactions in violation of the rule of Benedict v. Ratner 
could be voided by the trustee as fraudulent conveyances-not preferen-
tial transfers. Thus, the abolishment of Benedict v. Ratner did not abol-
ish the timing and value requirements of § 60.90 
This above excerpt and the discussion that follows it in the Grain 
11,ferchants opinion seems to indicate that the court is prematurely apply-
ing the revision of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act proposed by the National 
Bankruptcy Conference Committee on Coordination of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and Bankruptcy Act. The amendment provides that 
transfer of inventory and receivables pursuant to the terms of a properly 
perfected security agreement, and within four months prior to bankruptcy, 
shall not constitute preferences, provided that the receivables arose and 
the inventory was acquired by the debtor in the ordinary course of his 
business. This rule is qualified by a "two-point test": there shall be a 
preference to the extent that the aggregate value of the inventory or re-
ceivables or both, subject to the security agreement precisely four months 
earlier. Under the two-point test, a preference is measured solely by 
reference to these two points in time, irrespective of fluctuations in the 
collateral which may occur within the four-month period.91 While this 
proposal may one day become law, it is not now law92 and until it be-
comes law, § 60 requires that the substitution be simultaneous. 
E. Resolution 
No court has yet considered any of the bankruptcy challenges to § 
9-306( 4)( d) and law review writers differ as to how this matter will be 
88 Jd. at 12. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp. v. Gibralter Factors Corp., 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
89 268 U.S. 353 (1925); see generally 1 GILMORE§ 8.2 at 253. 
00 See Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 63 (1962); but cf. Coogan & 
Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Corporate Identure, 69 
YALB L J. 203, 244-45 (1959·60). 
91 See generally Kohn, Preferential Transfers on the Eve of The Bankruptcy Amendments, 
2 PROSPECTUS 259 (1968). 
92 Cf. Krause, The Code and The Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and After-
Acq11ired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 300 ( 1967). KING, SPECIAL PROBLEMS ON LoAN 
AGREEMENTS UNDER nm CODE, in PROCEEDINGS OF nm FIRST ANNuAL UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CoDE INSTITUTE, 167, 173 ( 1967). 
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resolved.93 However, even the most staunch advocate of the Code must 
concede that § 9-306 ( 4)( d) may infringe upon the Bankruptcy Act.94 
As adverted to above, § 9-306( 4) ( d) is not the only Code provision 
that presents problems as to possible conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act;95 
nor is the problem limited to Article 9.96 Ideally, reconcilliation of all 
of these possible conflicts should be achieved by simultaneous and e..~ten­
sive amendments to both acts.97 There are, however, a number of ob-
stacles to the achievement of this ideal. The relationship between the 
bankruptcy bar and the lawyers that represent secured creditors is at best 
less than cordial.98 These differences are in part attributable to sociolog-
ical factors99 and in part to the basic differences in the positions of their 
respective clients. The basic premise upon which Article 9 is founded 
runs contrary to the underlying principles of proceedings in bankruptcy. 
Article 9 rather than "lumping" all creditors together in a non-differ-
entiated class as does the Bankruptcy Act, permits the creation of security 
interest in personal property, thereby creating the preferred creditor. These 
obstacles are not insurmountable though. Since June, 1966, the National 
Bankruptcy Conference's Committee on Coordination of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act has been attempting to reconcile the 
two acts.100 Even should this Committee eventually achieve an accommoda-
tion satisfactory to both camps, action by both Congress and the legislatures 
of forty-nine states will be needed. As the ideal solution will not be soon 
achieved, it is submitted that the problem of the proceeds provision vis a 
vis the Bankruptcy Act presently be resolved by abolishing the distinction 
between the secured party's rights to proceeds under § 9-306( 4) ( d) before 
debtor's insolvency and after insolvency.101 This not only will eliminate 
possible challenges by the bankruptcy trustee under §§ 67, 70( c) and 60, 
but also the bizarre situations described in Part II above. 
93 Compare 2 GILMORE § 45.9 at 1336, with Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev. 898 
(1965-66). 
94 See Statement of Professor Grant Gilmore, in 32 NEW YORK LAW REv!SION Co~n.ns­
SION, STUDY OF THE UCC 155 (1954). 
95 See generally, Note, Some Problems Presented by the U.C.C. and The Bankruptcy Act, 29 
Prrr. L. R.Ev. 446 (1967-68). 
96 See Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to 
Recover the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 HARV.LR.Ev. 598 (1965-66). 
97 King, Some Thoughts on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and The Bank-
ruptcy Act, 72 CoM. L J. 203, 208 (1967). 
98See Henson, The Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 9 in The Bank-
ruptcy Courts, 22 U. MIAMI L. R.Ev. 101, 118 (1967-68). 
99 See M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 409-414 ( 1967); cf. V. COUNTRYMAN & A. KAUFMAN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 189 (temp. ed. 1968). 
100 For a discussion of the Committee's progress, see Kohn, Preferential Transfers on the Eve 
of the Bankruptcy Amendments, 2 PROSPECTUS 259 (1968). 
101 But cf. Steinheimer, The Uniform Commercial Code Comes of Age, 65 MIOL L R.Ev. 
1275, 1279 ( 1966-67). 
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